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INTRODUCTION 
The study of law and religion has tended to focus on debates 
over “church and state.” The central question has been how the law 
ought to structure the relationship between religion and the 
government. Many of the legal conflicts over religion, however, take 
place in a commercial context. They are thus not simply puzzles of 
how God and Caesar should interact. They also present the question 
of how the law should structure the relationship between God and 
Mammon.1 The exploration of co-religionist commerce by Professors 
Michael Helfand and Barak Richman2 is important because it places 
the law of church and market at center stage. Rather than viewing the 
intersection of commerce and religion as simply one more stage for 
church-state conflicts, they focus on the legal regulation of religious 
commerce. Their work reveals the dangers of uncritically applying 
law developed in other contexts to religious commerce. In so doing, 
they demonstrate the need for explicit reflection on the proper 
relationship between religion and the market and how the law should 
structure that relationship. 
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 1. Mammon is a Biblical term meaning material wealth or possessions that have a 
debasing influence.  
 2. Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 
64 DUKE L.J. 769 (2015).  
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This Essay uses Helfand and Richman’s fine article to raise the 
question of the law of church and market. In Part I, I argue that the 
question of religion’s proper relationship to the market is more than 
simply another aspect of the church-state debates. Rather, it is a topic 
deserving explicit reflection in its own right. In Part II, I argue that 
Helfand and Richman demonstrate the danger of creating the law of 
church and market by accident. Courts and legislators do this when 
they resolve questions religious commerce poses by applying legal 
theories developed without any thought for the proper relationship 
between church and market. Finally, in Part III, I examine one of the 
few areas in our law where we do explicitly try to structure the 
relationship between commerce and religion: antidiscrimination laws. 
I argue that the assumptions about the proper role of religion in the 
market on which these laws are predicated are actually quite different 
than the ultimately contractual regime that Helfand and Richman 
assume. While antidiscrimination laws do not directly implicate the 
doctrinal issues flagged in their article, the theoretical gap between 
their approach and antidiscrimination law illustrates the need for 
greater attention to the law of church and market. 
I.  THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE LAW OF CHURCH 
AND MARKET 
The “law of church and state” is a familiar part of the intellectual 
landscape for American lawyers, judges, and professors. We are well 
equipped with theories, metaphors, and intuitions about the proper 
relationship between the state and religious believers and institutions. 
This does not mean, of course, that there is any widespread 
agreement on precisely what shape this relationship should take. 
Brian Leiter, for example, argues that there is no reason to afford any 
particular legal solicitude to religious exercise, yet Congress enacted 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, exempting religious 
believers from otherwise neutral laws burdening activities required by 
their faith.3 We also have an abundance of metaphors: walls of 
separation,4 public squares from which religion should or should not 
 
 3. See generally BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012) (arguing that the 
idea of specifically religious toleration is incoherent); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006) 
(The Religious Freedom Restoration Act).  
 4. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“In the words of Jefferson, the 
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation 
between Church and State.’” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878))). 
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be excluded,5 and even the marketplace of religious competition from 
which the state remains aloof.6 Most everyone comes to the subject 
with well-formed opinions of either the separationist or 
accomodationist variety, and debates on church and state tend to play 
out with the comforting predictability of a well-practiced minuet. 
When it comes to the proper relationship between religion and 
the marketplace—the real, commercial marketplace, not the 
metaphor of First Amendment doctrine—the issue becomes more 
interesting. Here, we lack a clear set of theories and metaphors 
specifying what role, if any, religion should play in commerce. To be 
sure, we have a great deal of law that deals with religion and a great 
deal of law that regulates the market.7 There are thus no shortage of 
arguments and theories that can be repurposed from one field or 
another to guide the law on how it should mediate the relationship 
between religion and the market. We have, however, a paucity of 
theories that are native to the problem.8 Hence, when we look at laws 
regulating religion in the commercial context we tend to view them as 
simply another example of a “church-state” problem. We then 
proceed with our analysis, not pausing to consider that in resolving 
 
 5. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 907 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part 
and concurring in part) (“Perhaps in recognition of the centrality of the Ten Commandments as 
a widely recognized symbol of religion in public life, the Court is at pains to dispel the 
impression that its decision will require governments across the country to sandblast the Ten 
Commandments from the public square.”). But see generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE 
NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1988) (arguing 
that religion has been wrongly excluded from the public square in American political debates). 
 6. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (expressing that when the state creates “an expressive marketplace” 
it cannot exclude religious viewpoints). 
 7. In support of this claim, I can cite treatises or casebooks on law and religion. The mind, 
however, boggles at what one should cite to summarize the law regulating the market because of 
the sheer size of the literature. See generally MICHAEL MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & 
THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2002) (collecting key cases and 
materials on law and religion). 
 8. This is not entirely true, of course; there are scholars who have examined the legal 
relationship between commerce and religion. See generally Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby 
Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014) (discussing religious activity by for-profit corporations); 
Alan Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: 
Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014) (same); 
Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887 (2009) (discussing 
commercial activities by religious organizations); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565 (discussing religious activity by for-profit corporations); Mark L. 
Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 59 (2013) (same); Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights to Religious 
Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70 (2014) (same). 
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such conflicts we are inevitably instantiating a particular vision of how 
religion and commerce ought to relate to one another. We create the 
law of church and market by accident, without thinking about it. The 
proper relationship between commerce and religion and the law’s 
role in shaping that relationship, however, is a topic worthy of 
concern in its own right. To be sure, any time we consider how the 
law should treat religion, we are dealing with the “law of church and 
state.” When we look at religion and the market, however, we are 
doing more than simply playing out the minuet of church-state 
arguments on yet another stage. The market is a central social 
institution, one meriting careful reflection in its own right, including 
reflection on the role of the religion. 
The problem is exacerbated when we take note of the way that 
religion has come to be understood over the last few centuries, 
particularly in legal discourse. For Western legal thinkers prior to the 
end of the seventeenth century, “religion” was an all-embracing 
category of life and thought—the primary context in which other 
activities, including the activity of “law,” occurred.9 With the 
dénouement of the wars of religion and the rise of modernity, 
however, religion increasingly came to be conceptualized by legal 
thinkers as a fairly circumscribed area of life, one whose heartland lay 
in the realm of private worship and belief. The “law of church and 
state,” as we currently view it, rests on the assumption that there is 
some fairly circumscribed corner of social life that we can label 
“religious.” Under this assumption, the only question is how the law 
should relate to this limited sphere. The problem, however, is that 
many religious traditions have never really accepted the idea that 
“religion” is an activity confined to a relatively circumscribed space. 
Rather, for many believers, religion is a vital force that informs their 
activity in counting houses just as much as in houses of prayer. The 
“law of church and state” as a category of thought, however, tends 
toward a far more circumscribed—and, hence, less realistic—view of 
religious activity. 
Professors Helfand and Richman have done a great service by 
bringing co-religionist commerce—and with it the question of the 
proper relationship between religion and the market—to center stage. 
 
 9. Strikingly, in the Middle Ages the term “law” was used to refer to what today we would 
call “a religion.” Hence, Christianity was referred to as “the law of Christ,” Judaism as “the law 
of Jews,” and so on. See REMI BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF 
AN IDEA 107 (2008). 
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In thinking about the law of church and market, their article does two 
things. First, it offers a straightforward and attractive model of how 
religion and commerce ought to interact. Stated briefly, Helfand and 
Richman implicitly assume that the relationship of church and market 
ought to be mediated by autonomous choice. It is for the participants 
in market transactions to decide for themselves what role religion 
should play in commercial agreements. The law should seek to 
discern the intent of contracting parties and enforce their agreements. 
So long as the resulting legal obligations were agreed to, the law 
should enforce co-religionist contracts, even if they have religious 
content. Second, they demonstrate how law developed in a non-
commercial context—in this case the New Formalism in contract law 
and Establishment Clause doctrine—tends to undermine freedom of 
contract for co-religionist commerce. 
II.  ACCIDENTAL LAWS OF CHURCH AND MARKET 
According to Helfand and Richman, the central legal challenge 
for co-religionist commerce is the “translation problem” that arises 
when religious actors call on the courts to give legal effect to 
religiously infused commercial transactions.10 This translation 
problem is exacerbated by two legal developments—the New 
Formalism and Establishment Clause Creep—that limit the ability of 
courts to take notice of the religious content of commercial 
arrangements. There are two things worth noticing about this framing 
of the problem. First, it implicitly offers up contract as the proper 
regime for structuring the law of church and market. Second, both the 
New Formalism and Establishment Clause Creep offer alternative 
models for the law of church and market, models that are to some 
extent inhospitable to religious commerce. Neither of these models, 
however, is native to the question of the proper relationship between 
church and market. Rather, they were developed with other questions 
in mind, and the answers they give to the questions posed by co-
religionist commerce do not represent any reasoned conclusion about 
the proper relationship between faith and commerce. 
A. The New Formalism 
In adopting contract as the mechanism for structuring the 
relationship between religion and commerce, Helfand and Richman 
 
 10. Helfand & Richman, supra note 2, at 782.  
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implicitly defend a vision of the market that is essentially pluralistic. 
In this vision, the market does not serve a single purpose.11 Rather, it 
is a space in which mixed motives abound and individuals with 
potentially very different visions of life cooperate voluntarily.12 
Hence, a religiously themed business—say, a producer of Kosher 
meat products—exists both to make a profit and to facilitate the 
living of a pious Jewish life. A Sharia-compliant investment 
instrument exists both to earn a reasonable rate of return for Muslim 
savers without violating the Qur’an’s prohibition on riba and to 
provide financing to thoroughly secular enterprises, such as 
municipalities.13 None of these aims can claim pride of place. A 
Kosher butcher who adheres with perfect fidelity to the laws of 
kashrut but fails to make a profit is a failure. Likewise, an Islamic 
bank cannot substitute junk bonds for a bai’ al’inah (sale and buy-
back agreement) even though the junk bonds might earn a higher rate 
of return.14 Rather, the “correct” treatment of a given transaction can 
only be given by the actual agreement of the parties. It is their choice 
that legitimizes the balance struck between religion and commerce, 
not the particular content of their agreement. 
This view is familiar to autonomy theorists of contract, who 
ground contractual obligation in the free choices of contracting 
parties.15 As Helfand and Richman demonstrate, however, the New 
Formalism in contract interpretation frequently frustrates the 
intentions of religious parties by adopting aggressive versions of 
textual interpretation and the parol evidence rule.16 The New 
Formalism ultimately flows from a far less pluralistic vision of the 
 
 11. For an exploration of pluralistic, non-efficiency based defenses of the market, see 
DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
MARKETS 15–26 (2010); see also Nathan B. Oman, Markets As a Moral Foundation for Contract 
Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 183 (2012) (discussing non-efficiency based defenses of the market). 
 12. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 5 (1992) (discussing markets as an 
institutional mechanism for cooperation in pluralistic societies). 
 13. See generally MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PRACTICE (2006) (providing a summary to the current practice of Islamic banking); TIMUR 
KURAN, ISLAM AND MAMMON: THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS OF ISLAMISM (2004) 
(discussing the role of Islam in Muslim thinking about commerce and the rise of so-called 
Islamic economics). 
 14. See HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC BANKING 135 (M. Kabir Hassan & Mervyn K. Lewis eds., 
2007) (discussing bai’ al’inah transactions in Islamic finance). 
 15. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 54–77 (2004) (summarizing promissory 
theories of contract). 
 16. See Helfand & Richman, supra note 2, at 788–89. 
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market than the one that Helfand and Richman implicitly assume.17 
Consider the work of Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz, who have 
argued for a particularly stringent view of the parol evidence rule, one 
that would frustrate the kind of highly contextual interpretation 
favored by Helfand and Richman for co-religionist commerce.18 Scott 
and Schwartz in effect argue that profit-maximizing firms that are 
repeat players in contract litigation view their contracts like an 
investment portfolio.19 When these contracts end up in litigation, 
courts sometimes err by either deciding the case in way that hurts the 
firm or by deciding the case in way that helps the firm and provides a 
windfall. As long as the errors are randomly distributed, “bad” 
decisions will cancel out “good” decisions. By adopting a stringent 
version of the parol evidence rule, courts lower litigation costs while 
creating greater volatility in litigation outcomes. Firms, however, 
diversify away the risk of such volatility by having many contracts 
and, thus, reaping the benefits from lower litigation costs generated 
by the strict parol evidence rule. 
This is not the place to pass judgment on Schwartz and Scott’s 
argument. Rather, I want to note that it—along with similar 
arguments offered by partisans of the New Formalism—rests on a 
relatively monistic conception of markets.20 On this view, markets 
exist to efficiently allocate resources, and the law that structures the 
market should be specified so as to maximize profits narrowly 
construed. Notice that, in order for the argument of Scott and 
Schwartz to work, firms must regard contracts as essentially fungible 
and commensurable. In effect, each contract becomes little more than 
a security in a diversified portfolio—a legal right that will deliver a 
certain amount of cash depending on the vagaries of law and the 
market. This is what allows firms to net out the gains and losses from 
judicial errors and reap the benefits of lower dispute-resolution costs. 
This monistic conception of the market, however, runs up against the 
 
 17. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541, 544–45 (2003) (arguing that the sole concern in contracts between 
corporations should be economic efficiency); see generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002) (arguing that efficiency should be the sole 
concern in specifying contract law, property law, and other legal regimes). 
 18. See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 17 (arguing against contextual 
interpretation in commercial contracts). 
 19. See id. at 574–78. 
 20. See id. at 544–45 (arguing that efficiency should be the sole concern in contracts 
between corporations). 
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more pluralistic approach implicitly taken by Helfand and Richman, 
who are willing to incur greater litigation expenses in order to get 
outcomes that more closely conform with the religious intentions of 
the parties in each transaction.21 As they demonstrate, co-religionist 
commerce has in at least some cases been a victim of a narrow 
conception of the market. The New Formalism, of course, in no sense 
developed as a normative theory of the relationship between religion 
and commerce. Rather, in this instance co-religionist commerce is a 
victim of legal theories developed to address quite different problems 
and repurposed without much thought to serve as a law of church and 
market. 
B. Establishment Clause Creep 
The same is true of the Establishment Clause Creep that Helfand 
and Richman identify.22 The decades before and after the Civil War 
marked a period of religious schism. American denominations such as 
the Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians split along regional lines 
over the issue of slavery.23 In 1871, one of these disputes reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones.24 The case involved a split 
within a Louisville, Kentucky congregation between supporters of the 
Presbyterian Church of the United States of America and the 
Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States of America.25 The 
rival factions both claimed to be the true successors of the original 
church and therefore the owner of its property.26 Rather than trying to 
resolve this issue on the ecclesiastical merits, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that because the Presbyterian Church was a hierarchical 
organization, the courts had to defer to the larger denomination’s 
judgment as to which of the rival factions represented the true 
successor to the original church.27 In adopting this rule, the Court 
 
 21. Helfand & Richman, supra note 2, at 802. 
 22. Id. at 803–10. 
 23. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and 
Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 358–69 (2014) (discussing schisms over 
slavery before the Civil War and the resulting litigation involving churches); Lucas P. Volkman, 
Church Property Disputes, Religious Freedom, and the Ordeal of African Methodists in 
Antebellum St. Louis: Farrar v. Finney (1855), 27 J. L. & REL. 83, 86–89 (2012) (discussing 
schisms within the Methodist church over slavery). 
 24. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
 25. See id. at 690–94. 
 26. See id. at 684–86. 
 27. See id. at 727–28. In this case the Court held that civil courts had to defer to the 
decision of the Presbyterian Church of the United States. While the Presbyterian Church of the 
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rejected the approach taken by the British courts in disputes over 
church property.28 The practice in the British courts was for the judge 
to determine which claimant to church property was the theologically 
true successor to the original congregation.29 The Court rejected this 
approach because in America, it stated, “The law knows no heresy, 
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no 
sect.”30 A short time later, the Court heard a case involving a schism 
within a Methodist congregation, in which it ruled that because 
Methodism adopted a congregational rather than a hierarchical 
model of church governance, the civil court should award control of 
church property to the faction that commanded a majority of the 
original congregation’s members.31 While these cases were not 
decided on Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause grounds, in 
the twentieth century Watson v. Jones was repurposed as a First 
Amendment precedent and the Court issued a series of decisions that 
limited the ability of courts to inquire into religious questions in the 
context of disputes over church property.32 Tellingly, these decisions 
shifted away from Watson v. Jones’s emphasis on neutral principles in 
favor of a regime in which courts were deemed to simply lack the 
competence to judge disputes between religious parties. 
My goal here is not to comment on the doctrinal intricacies of 
the Court’s church-property cases or to question Helfand and 
Richman’s analysis of how that doctrine has been expanded to 
frustrate co-religionist commerce.33 Rather, I wish to call attention to 
 
Confederate States still existed as late as 1866, the Court never explained why civil magistrates 
shouldn’t have deferred to the Confederate ecclesiastical organization. See id. There are two 
possibilities. By the time of the litigation, the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States 
may have ceased to exist. Alternatively, the Court may have decided that it must defer to the 
Presbyterian Church of the United States because it was undisputed that the Louisville 
congregation had originated with this denomination. 
 28. See id. at 727–29. 
 29. See Pearson v. Attorney General, [1835] 58 Eng. Rep. (Ch) 848, 854–55, aff’d, Shore v. 
Attorney General, [1839] 8 Eng. Rep. (H.L.) 450 (holding that church property of a dissenting 
sect could not be controlled by church members that rejected Trinitarianism in favor of 
Unitarianism). 
 30. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729. 
 31. See generally Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131 (1872) (resolving a dispute over church 
property involving an African-American Methodist congregation in the District of Columbia). 
 32. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevick, 426 U.S. 696, 710–12 (1976); Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 
367, 367 (1970) (per curiam); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445–46 (1969); 
Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 190 (1960) (per curiam); Kendroff v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952).  
 33. Helfand & Richman, supra note 2, at 803–08. 
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the fact that none of the case law developed by the Supreme Court in 
this area arose out of commercial disputes. Indeed, this is the 
quintessential example of a church-state problem where the 
government is called on to make decisions regarding the allocation of 
power and control within a religious organization. The courts speak 
of neutral principles of contract law, but originally the framework was 
not developed in the context of commercial contracts but 
ecclesiastical schisms. As Helfand and Richman demonstrate, when 
an expansive reading of these cases is applied to co-religionist 
commerce, it tends to have the effect of disabling the courts from 
providing support to such commerce in the form of contractual 
enforcement.34 The Court developed these doctrines in order to 
separate—insofar as possible—secular courts from internal 
theological disputes within religious organizations. When this effort 
to separate church and state is applied to co-religionist commerce, 
however, it tends to have the effect of separating church and market. 
There is no reason to suppose that this was the intention of the Court 
in promulgating these doctrines, and in any case none of the courts 
applying these doctrines offer any sustained defense of legal hostility 
to religiously infused commerce. Rather, we end up with a 
separationist stance on church and market that arose accidentally by 
repurposing a set of legal doctrines to answer a set of questions that 
they were never designed to resolve. 
The challenges of New Formalism and Establishment Clause 
Creep to co-religionist commerce demonstrate the problems of 
constructing a law of church of market without thinking about it. 
Courts import legal approaches from contexts unrelated to religious 
commerce and in effect construct the law of church and market by 
accident. Helfand and Richman seem to have a theory about the 
proper relationship between commerce and religion. Their article 
accepts contract as a proper law of church and market. Freedom of 
contract is so closely associated with a market regime that it seems a 
natural way of structuring the relationship between religion and 
commerce. The desirability of this approach, however, cannot be 
taken as self-evident. Freedom of contract has not always structured 
even ordinary commercial relationships. Strikingly, in the one area 
where our law does rest on explicit reflection about the proper 
relationship between commerce and religion, namely 
 
 34. Id. at 803–10.  
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antidiscrimination law, it has rejected freedom of contract as a master 
norm. 
III.  AN INTENTIONAL LAW OF CHURCH AND MARKET 
At times partisans of freedom of contract romanticize the legal 
world before the rise of the modern regulatory state as a period when 
voluntary private ordering structured the market.35 Such a view tends 
to oversimplify the past. Rather, as Henry Sumner Maine famously 
remarked, the “the movement of the progressive societies has 
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”36 One can 
envision market participants as occupying certain roles, roles that 
impose on those participants legal duties in the absence of consent 
and even in the face of an unwillingness to contract. Blackstone gave 
the example of common carriers and innkeepers. “[I]f an inn-keeper, 
or other victualer, hangs out a sign and opens his house for travellers, 
it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons who travel that 
way,” he wrote.37 “[U]pon this universal assumpsit an action on the 
case will lie against him for damages, if he without good reason refuse 
to admit a traveller.”38 Such a duty implies the inability of certain 
market actors to resist contracting with someone without good cause. 
The duty in some circumstances to contract with all comers existed at 
common law, and has been enacted in modern antidiscrimination 
statutes.39 These statutes often include religion as a protected category 
and thus seek—in part—to structure the relationship between church 
and market on a non-contractual basis. 
 
 35. See Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law through the 
Lens of Laissez-Faire, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 25–26 (F. H. 
Buckley ed., 1999) (suggesting that prior to the rise of the post–New Deal regulatory state a 
largely laissez-faire approach to markets prevailed). 
 36. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (4th American ed. 1906). 
 37. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 164 (1769). 
 38. Id. at 164 (emphasis omitted).  
 39. Joseph Singer has argued strenuously that the duty at common law prior to the Civil 
War to serve the public without discrimination included not just innkeepers and common 
carriers but all retailers and others holding themselves out to the public. See Joseph Singer, No 
Right to Exclude: Public Accomodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1303–48 
(1996). His argument is weakened by the fact that he is unable to cite to a single case in which 
such a duty was imposed on a party other than a common carrier or innkeeper. However, Singer 
is surely correct that the common law imposed duties on market participants on the basis of 
status and that at least some commercial actors at common law could not refuse to contract with 
customers without cause. 
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A. Antidiscrimination Law 
Modern antidiscrimination laws are a product of the civil rights 
movement and take racial animus as the paradigmatic case of 
pernicious discrimination.40 Nevertheless, when the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 forbade racial discrimination in employment, by common 
carriers, and in public accommodations, it also prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of religion.41 Other antidiscrimination laws 
promulgated at the federal, state, and local level similarly include 
religion as a protected category. These laws replace freedom of 
contract with a set of legal duties that have the effect of making 
commerce both less religious and more religious or at least more 
overtly pluralistic religiously. Employers can no longer refuse to 
employ someone on the basis of the person’s religious beliefs, even if 
the discrimination is religiously motivated.42 Likewise, state laws 
prohibiting discrimination may require business owners to participate 
in transactions they find religiously objectionable. Hence, a landlord 
in Alaska was required to rent to an unmarried couple by 
 
 40. For example, the committee report on the House version of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 contained an exhaustive discussion of the problems faced by African Americans in seeking 
employment and access to public accommodations, but contained no discussion of religious 
discrimination. See generally EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1997) (collecting the committee reports and floor 
debates on the Civil Rights Act). As one treatise has noted, “[e]fforts to eradicate 
discrimination based on religion do not appear to be inspired by a history of economic 
disadvantage of religious groups.” LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.04 (2d. 
ed. 2014). The treatise does note the existence of widespread employment discrimination 
against Jews and Catholics. See id. at § 2.04. 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (“All 
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined 
in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of . . . religion”). Contrary 
to the assumption of most laypersons and many lawyers, there is no federal law that bars 
discrimination by retailers and businesses that are not public accommodations. See Singer, supra 
note 39, at 1288 (“Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulates restaurants, innkeepers, gas 
stations, and places of entertainment. Retail stores are not covered.”). Some scholars suggest 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 might bar racial discrimination by retailers, but the Supreme 
Court has never addressed the issue. Id. at 1288–89. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 413 (1968) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 barred private discrimination in the 
sale of real estate). 
 42. See, e.g., Fischer v. Forestwood Co., 525 F.3d 972, 987 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding a father 
liable for employment discrimination for refusing to hire his son because of the son’s apostasy 
from the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints). 
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antidiscrimination laws despite religious objections to assisting the 
couple to “live in sin,”43 a doctor in California was required to provide 
fertility treatments to a lesbian couples despite religious objections to 
homosexuality,44 and a photographer in New Mexico faced liability for 
refusing to photograph a homosexual couple’s nuptials based on her 
religious objections to same-sex marriage.45 In all of these cases, a 
regime of freedom of contract would have allowed the objecting 
religious actor to avoid contracting, and in all of these cases the 
religiously motivated refusal to contract was in fact a legal wrong. In 
such situations, antidiscrimination laws tend to exclude religious 
considerations from commercial contexts. 
At the same time, antidiscrimination laws can at times make 
commercial contexts more rather than less religious by creating legal 
support for an overtly religious albeit pluralistic market. Title VII 
states that: 
The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he 
is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective 
employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer’s business.46 
Employers thus have a legal obligation to accommodate the religious 
practices of employees so long as doing so does not create an “undue 
burden.” The Supreme Court has interpreted this standard in a way 
that makes it relatively easy for employers to show the presence of 
such a burden.47 Nevertheless, the religious accommodation 
 
 43. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 847 P.2d 274, 276 (Alaska 1994) 
(holding that the landlord was not entitled to a religious exemption from municipal 
antidiscrimination statutes); see also Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 931 
(Cal. 1996) (reaching the same conclusion under a California law analyzed under the First 
Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the California state constitution). 
 44. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 
959, 962 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the doctor’s refusal to serve the lesbian couple violated 
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and that there was no First Amendment exemption from 
the law). 
 45. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (holding that 
application of the antidiscrimination statute to the photographer did not violate either state or 
federal protections for religious freedom), cert. denied, 2014 WL 1343625. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
 47. See generally Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (providing a 
narrow interpretation of Title VII’s duty to accommodate religious practices); see also LARSON, 
supra note 40, at §§ 56.02–56.06 (discussing the application of the Hardison standard in 
accommodation litigation under Title VII). 
OMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2015  12:19 PM 
154 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 64:141 
requirement has some bite. Hence, those with religious objections to 
abortion have successfully demanded exemptions from employer 
requirements that they provide abortion counseling.48 In some cases, 
sabbatarians of various stripes have been able to demand different 
work schedules to accommodate Sabbath observance.49 Abercrombie 
& Fitch was successfully sued by a Muslim employee who objected to 
the company’s dress code, which barred her from wearing a hijab.50 In 
other cases, Muslim employees have successfully demanded that 
employers allow them to pray five times each day, as required by 
Islamic law, as well as allow an employee to make the hajj—the once 
in a lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca required of all pious Muslims—
without losing her job.51 In all of these cases, employers were required 
by law to take steps that made their workplaces more welcoming to 
religion, in effect making commerce more rather than less religious. 
Antidiscrimination laws envision a relationship between 
commerce and religion that is ultimately quite different than the one 
envisioned by the ideal of freedom of contract. Under a regime of 
freedom of contract the market is seen as a largely “private” space, 
one that need not conform to democratic norms of secular equality so 
long as the relationships are consensual. In contrast, the 
antidiscrimination laws rest on the view that the market is a “public” 
space in at least two senses. 
First, they rest on the implicit denial that the ordering of 
commerce can be left to private agreements without excluding some 
classes of individuals from meaningful participation in the market. 
 
 48. See Grant v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., No. Civ. 02-4243, 2004 WL 326694, at 
*3–5 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2004) (holding that employer must provide reasonable—but not 
unreasonable—accommodations to an employee with religious objections to abortion). 
 49. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sterling Merch. Co., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 1448, at *10–11 
(N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that employer must at least make an effort to accommodate the 
Sabbath observance of a Jehovah’s Witness employee).  
 50. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., 966 F. Supp.2d 949, 971 (N.D. Cal. 
2013) (holding that requiring the employers to allow the plaintiff to wear a hijab would not have 
imposed an undue burden); see also Muhammad v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 450 F. Supp. 2d 198, 
211–12 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that a Muslim employee was not required to wear a NYTA 
baseball cap over her hijab). 
 51. See Hasan v. Threshold Rehab., Inc., No. 13-cv-00387, 2014 WL 1225921, at *8–9 (E.D. 
Pa. 2014) (holding that plaintiff had pled sufficient facts on a failure to accommodate claim 
based on her pilgrimage to Mecca); EEOC v. JBS USA LLC, 940 F. Supp.2d 949, 956–61 (D. 
Neb. 2013) (detailing the efforts of employer to accommodate prayers by Muslim employees); 
Haliye v. Celestica Corp., No. 06-cv-4769, 2009 WL 1653528, at *10 (D. Minn. 2009) (refusing to 
certify class of Muslim employees alleging failure to accommodate religious duty to pray five 
times daily). 
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Defenders of antidiscrimination laws insist that “it is a distinctly 
romantic notion that competition necessarily ensures that someone 
will provide the service.”52 Likewise, the House Report on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, relying on the old common law rules governing 
innkeepers, stated that it was “ludicrous” to talk of the private 
conduct of those subject to the law because they were “open to the 
public in general.”53 According to the Report there was “little basis 
for urging [the principle of freedom of association] in [sic] behalf of 
owners of business who regularly serve the public in general.”54 
Second, antidiscrimination laws see the market as an important 
public space from which one cannot be excluded on the basis of 
certain characteristics, including religion. Like voting or a public 
forum, the market is a space to which citizens have a publically 
secured right of access, notwithstanding confounding “private” 
arrangements. Likewise, religiously motivated commercial activity 
will not be tolerated if it has the effect of inhibiting access to the 
market by others. These norms are closely analogous to constitutional 
rules prohibiting religious tests for public office and requiring that 
citizens be treated equally.55 It is no accident that the protected classes 
under antidiscrimination laws overlap substantially with the classes 
that trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.56 Such a 
 
 52. Singer, supra note 39, at 1329–30; see Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop 
Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22, 22–37 (1991) (arguing that markets are not a good 
system for promoting antidiscrimination practices). Richard Epstein, however, disputes this 
assumption, arguing that discrimination in the Jim Crow South resulted from state action and 
quasi-state action rather than market failure. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN 
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 126–27 (1995) (“No 
firm could have entered the market in the face of the political forces that were arrayed against 
it. The dog that did not bark gives the best evidence of pervasive government involvement in 
this area.”). 
 53. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 40, at 2130. 
 54. Id.  
 55. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”); U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the law.”). 
 56. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that racial 
classifications are inherently suspect), Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (striking 
down a law that discriminated based on national origin), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
682 (1973) (holding that classifications on the basis of gender are subject to heightened 
scrutiny), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997) (holding the laws may not 
discriminate on the basis of religion), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an 
unlawful employment practice . . . to discriminate against any individuals with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
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view also rejects a monistic conception of the market as serving only 
to efficiently allocate resources. To be sure, some have argued that 
antidiscrimination laws make markets more efficient, but one 
suspects that few would abandon their support for such laws even if 
they became convinced that they were inefficient.57 
Antidiscrimination laws thus reject the notion that religious believers 
should be able to pursue religious goals in the commercial sphere so 
long as they do so contractually. Rather, religiously motivated 
commercial activity is a legal wrong when it violates norms of equal 
access to the market, even if such activity is contractual. 
B. Beyond the Antidiscrimination Model 
Recent debates over religious exercise by for-profit corporations 
suggest a vision of the law of church and market that grows out of 
antidiscrimination norms but takes a more restrictive stance toward 
religion and commerce. Rather than insisting that religious norms and 
freedom of contract must be subordinate to antidiscrimination norms 
of universal access, this more aggressive approach suggests that there 
is something presumptively suspect about religion in the for-profit 
context. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,58 a divided Supreme 
Court ruled that for-profit corporations could claim religious 
exemptions from neutral laws burdening religious exercise, in this 
case regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services requiring that certain employers provide their 
employees insurance coverage for all FDA-approved forms of 
contraception, including those that the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby 
regarded as abortifacients.59 For purposes of this Essay, what is 
 
 57. For the debate over the efficiency of antidiscrimination laws, compare John Donohue, 
Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1411–31 (1986) (arguing that Title VII is 
economically efficient), with Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. 
PA. L. REV. 513, 513–21 (1987) (expressing skepticism as to the efficiency of Title VII). 
 58. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 59. See id. at 2762–64 (describing the HHS mandate). I have no desire to comment on the 
merits of the outcome in the case here. For the record, I largely agree with Justice Alito’s 
analysis of religious exercise by corporations. Compare id. at 2768–70 (holding that for-profit 
corporations can exercise religion and are “persons” for purposes of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act), with Meese & Oman, supra note 8 (arguing that for-profit corporations can 
exercise religion and are “persons” for purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). On 
the other hand, I am critical of Justice Alito’s analysis of burdens on religious exercise imposed 
by laws that create complicity in the actions of others. Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2775–80 (holding that courts cannot inquire into the substantiality of the burden created by 
forced complicity in the actions of others), with Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby: The Problem 
of Complicity, THE CONGLOMERATE (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/
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interesting about the decision is the vision of the law of church and 
market revealed by the rhetoric of the losers in the case. At the 
outset, it’s striking that both the majority opinion and the principal 
dissent in the case invoke antidiscrimination norms. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Alito claimed: 
The owners of many closely held corporations could not in good 
conscience provide such coverage, and thus HHS would effectively 
exclude these people from full participation in the economic life of 
the Nation. RFRA was enacted to prevent such an outcome.60 
Likewise, in her dissent Justice Ginsburg claimed that the Court’s 
holding threatened “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in 
the economic and social life of the Nation.”61 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, however, suggests a vision of the 
market in which a legally constructed pluralism precludes religiously 
infused businesses. Distinguishing for-profit corporations from 
“nonprofit religion-based organizations,”62 she wrote: 
Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons 
subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of for-profit 
corporations. Workers who sustain the operations of those 
corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious 
community. Indeed, by law, no religion-based criterion can restrict 
the work force of for-profit corporations. The distinction between a 
community made up of believers in the same religion and one 
embracing persons of diverse beliefs, clear as it is, constantly escapes 
the Court’s attention.63 
 
2014/03/hobby-lobby-the-problem-of-complicity.html (arguing that recognizing religious 
burdens created by required complicity in the acts of others risks undermining religious 
freedom), and Nathan B. Oman, Religious Freedom, Commerce, and Complicity, THE 
CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/religious-freedom-
commerce-and-complicity.html (same). 
 60. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783. It is also worth noting that Justice Alito was eager to 
reject the claim that the Court’s holding would threaten antidiscrimination laws: 
The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example 
on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal 
sanction. . . . The Government has a compelling interest in providing equal 
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions 
on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal. 
Id. (internal citation omitted).  
 61. See id. at 2787–88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)). 
 62. Id. at 2794. 
 63. Id. at 2795–96 (internal citations omitted). 
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In this passage, Justice Ginsburg takes note of the way that 
antidiscrimination norms structure the relationship between religion 
and markets. Her claim regarding the legal impermissibility of 
religious discrimination in hiring is largely correct, although in some 
instances lower courts have found that religion is a bona fide 
occupational requirement.64 As a factual matter, however, Justice 
Ginsburg’s vision of a market consisting only of religiously pluralistic 
firms devoid of a structuring religious mission is false. Such firms exist 
and have long existed.65 We should thus understand it as a normative 
claim rather than an empirical observation. 
Similarly, some commentators have suggested that there is a kind 
of social contract involved when religious believers enter the market 
by creating a for-profit corporation. When they do this, so goes the 
argument, they give up the ability to pursue religious goals. Writing in 
response to the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, for example, Erwin 
Chemerinsky argued that “[b]y creating a corporation, the owners 
chose to get the benefits of having an entity separate from 
themselves; they should accept the burdens of not being able to claim 
that the business is an extension of their religious views.”66 As a 
matter of corporate law, Chemerinsky is wrong. Under general 
incorporation statutes, a corporation can be formed for “any lawful 
purpose.”67 There is nothing in general business incorporation statutes 
suggesting a quid pro quo in which the benefits of the corporate form 
are conditioned on accepting limitations on otherwise lawful activity. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in corporate law that prohibits owners 
from running a corporation as “an extension of their religious 
 
 64. See Kern v. Dynaelectron, Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (holding 
that an employer’s requirement that an employee convert to Islam in order to work as a 
helicopter pilot in the City of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, where non-Muslims can be executed, was 
a bona fide occupational requirement). 
 65. See Meese and Oman, supra note 8, at 278–80 (providing examples of religiously 
themed for-profit businesses); Sarah Barringer Gordon & Nomi Stolzenberg, Hobby Lobby, 
Wheaton College, and a New Religious Order, RELIGION & POLITICS (July 14, 2014), 
http://religionandpolitics.org/2014/07/14/hobby-lobby-wheaton-college-and-a-new-religious-
order (“The Methodist Book Concern, for example, whose operations were based in New York 
City and Cincinnati, was the largest publishing house in the world by 1850.”). 
 66. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Broad Reach of the Narrow Hobby Lobby Ruling, L.A. 
TIMES (June 30, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinsky-
hobby-lobby-supreme-court-20140701-story.html. 
 67. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 101(b) (2014). (“A corporation may be incorporated or 
organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes, except as 
may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this State.”). 
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views.”68 Justice Ginsburg, however, adopted an analogous view, 
claiming that “for-profit corporations are different from religious 
non-profits in that they use labor to make a profit, rather than to 
perpetuate the religious values shared by a community of believers.”69 
For my purposes, the interest of these statements does not lie in 
their empirical or legal accuracy. Rather, it lies in the strong 
normative vision of the law of church and market that they present. 
Although both Justice Ginsburg and Professor Chemerinsky are 
making arguments about the corporate form, clearly the “for-profit” 
rather than the “corporate” aspect of Hobby Lobby’s activities drives 
their analysis. Justice Ginsburg, for example, goes out of her way to 
note that churches, which are organized as corporations, do not fall 
within her analysis.70 Furthermore, the antidiscrimination laws on 
which she bases her argument are not limited to corporations but 
include natural persons, sole proprietorships, and partnerships.71 
Rather, their argument rests on a vision of the relationship of religion 
to the market, one in which religious considerations must be excluded 
in commercial contexts—or at least marginalized—in order to ensure 
that the market remains a widely accessible and largely secular 
domain. 
It would be dangerous, of course, to generalize too much from 
the arguments surrounding the Hobby Lobby decision. It is a single 
case and—as with any major Supreme Court decision—it represents 
the intersection of several different strands of political and legal 
argument. Nevertheless, it is a striking instance of explicit reflection 
on the proper relationship between religion and commerce. Narrowly 
conceived, Hobby Lobby was a pretty traditional church-state case. 
Indeed, this is precisely how the majority treated it. The government 
passed a law, and religious citizens claimed that the law violated their 
right to exercise their religion. The case, however, was not simply 
about the relationship between religious believers and the state. It 
 
 68. See Meese and Oman, supra note 8, at 281–85 (discussing the various corporate law 
mechanisms for infusing a firm with religious goals and practices). 
 69. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797–98 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 70. See id. at 2793–95.  
 71. Compare id. at 2795–96 (arguing that for-profit corporations cannot represent a 
community of religious believers because of the antidiscrimination requirements of Title VII), 
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty 
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a 
person . . . .”). 
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was also about the relationship between religion and commerce, and 
how the law should structure that relationship. There is one 
generalization from Hobby Lobby I am willing to hazard: The case 
has not resolved our conflicts over the proper relationship between 
church and market, and, increasingly, scholars of law and religion will 
need to do more than simply recapitulate the traditional arguments 
over church and state in the commercial context. Rather, they will 
need to think deeply about how the law should structure markets and 
the role that religion should play in that structure. 
CONCLUSION 
My goal in this brief Essay has been to raise a question: How 
should the law structure the relationship between commerce and 
religion? Helfand and Richman’s article reveals the necessity of 
addressing this question directly. Importing legal theories from other 
fields, in effect, creates a law of church and market without thinking 
about it. Their work illustrates the costs of doing so. However, once 
one begins reflecting on the law of church and market in its own 
right—rather than as simply a commercial instantiation of familiar 
debates over church and state—the difficulty of the issues becomes 
manifest. Helfand and Richman implicitly offer contract as a 
paradigm for thinking about religion and commerce. This approach, 
however, is far from the only one available in our legal culture. 
Antidiscrimination norms provide a powerful alternative in which the 
social construction of a particular kind of market—one that is 
pluralistic, open to all, and in some sense “secular”—takes priority 
over freedom of contract. The tension between these two approaches 
illustrates the need for more and better reflection on the relationship 
between commerce and religion. Before we decide which of these 
approaches is best, we must bring their assumptions out into the 
open, examine them, and decide whether they are justified. This is a 
task that neither scholars nor judges have yet undertaken. It is time 
that they did. 
 
